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Abstract: The UK government has expressed a desire to increase social mobility, with policies to 
help achieve this aim focused on reducing inequalities in educational attainment. This paper draws 
together established and new information about the contribution that higher education can make to 
social mobility using a life-course approach, considering differences by family background in terms 
of  university attendance and achievement, as well as occupation and earnings following gradu-
ation. We find substantial socio-economic differences at each stage. Young people from poorer 
backgrounds are, on average, less likely to go to university than their richer peers. Even among 
the selected group who do go to university, they are less likely to attend the highest status institu-
tions, less likely to graduate, and less likely to achieve the highest degree classes. These differences 
in degree outcomes contribute to the lower average earnings of  graduates from poorer families, 
but earnings differentials go well beyond those driven purely by degree attainment or institution 
attended. The evidence strongly suggests that, even after taking these factors into account, gradu-
ates from affluent families are more likely to obtain a professional job and to see higher earnings 
growth in the labour market. We discuss the implications of  these findings for the prospects of 
higher education as a route to greater social mobility.
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I. Introduction
There is a well-established literature highlighting that children from more affluent 
families earn more across the life course than their peers from less affluent families, 
and that the UK is a poor performer in this regard, with a high degree of  inequal-
ity of  opportunity (Blanden et al., 2007; Corak, 2013; Jerrim and Macmillan, 2015; 
Gregg et al., 2016). The UK government has recently moved to place ‘social mobil-
ity’, the phrase most commonly used by politicians and commentators to describe 
the link between the socio-economic circumstances of  parents and children, as a key 
social policy priority.
Much of  the policy debate that has followed has focused on reducing inequalities 
in educational attainment, based on the reasonable premise that children with the 
same attainment should achieve more similar outcomes over the life course. Given 
the substantial returns to higher education that have been found in the UK (e.g. 
Walker and Zhu, 2011), participation and achievement in higher education have 
been a particular focus of  recent attempts to reduce such inequalities of  educational 
opportunity.
In this paper we assess the recent literature on the potential role of higher education 
in promoting social mobility, discussing socio-economic differences in university access 
and outcomes, and adding new contributions on attainment trajectories within univer-
sity by family background, and how the returns to a degree vary by parental income. 
Given the substantial differences in university application and entry by gender that now 
exist in the UK and elsewhere (e.g. Chowdry et al. 2013; Jerrim and Vignoles, 2015), 
and the concerns attached to the participation rates of working class white boys in 
particular, we also consider the interaction between gender and socio-economic status 
in these outcomes, providing some confirmatory and some new evidence on the drivers 
of these differences.
We find substantial socio-economic differences at each stage of the student life-
course. Young people from poorer backgrounds are, on average, less likely to go to uni-
versity than their richer peers. Even among the selected group who do go to university, 
they are less likely to attend the highest status institutions, less likely to graduate, and 
less likely to achieve the highest degree classes. These differences in degree outcomes 
contribute to the reduced likelihood of moving into a professional job and the lower 
average earnings of graduates from poorer families, but the differences in labour mar-
ket outcomes that we observe go well beyond these differences in degree achievement. 
Indeed, in new analysis presented in this paper, we find that the average graduate wage 
for a child from a poor family is comparable to the average wage of all graduates and 
non-graduates combined from affluent families, and that these differences in earnings 
between graduates from different backgrounds persist even once we account for edu-
cational attainment, including university attended and subject studied. This highlights 
that getting a good degree from an elite university is not enough to equalize career 
opportunities in the professions and prime-age earnings for those from different socio-
economic backgrounds.
While much of the policy emphasis to date has focused on widening access to uni-
versity, including to high-status institutions, our research highlights a need for policy 
intervention throughout the student life-course, to ensure equality of opportunity and 
outcomes for those from different socio-economic backgrounds.
Claire Crawford, Paul Gregg, Lindsey Macmillan, Anna Vignoles, and Gill Wyness554
II. Socio-economic differences in higher education 
participation
It is well known that there are large gaps in the higher education (HE) participation rates 
of young people from different socio-economic backgrounds. Although the proportion 
of students from poor backgrounds going to university has increased significantly over 
time, the gap in the HE participation rate between richer and poorer students remains 
stark (Blanden and Machin, 2004, 2008; Blanden et al., 2005; Crawford et al., 2016b).
Focusing on data for a cohort of state school students who took their GCSEs in 
England in 2008 (and started university anywhere in the UK at age 18 in 2010–11 or 
age 19 in 2011–12), Figure 1 shows the likelihood of participating in higher education 
for those in the top and bottom fifth of households, as measured by an index of socio-
economic status combining students’ eligibility for free school meals and the extent of 
deprivation in their neighbourhood.1 The black bars show the gaps in terms of partici-
pation at all universities and the grey bars show the gaps in terms of participation at a 
group of 41 ‘high status’ universities, which include all members of the Russell Group, 
plus institutions with similarly high research quality (based on the Research Assessment 
1 Specifically, the index combines, using principal components analysis, the pupil’s eligibility for free 
school meals at age 16 with their Index of Multiple Deprivation (IMD) score, their ACORN type (a socio-
economic indicator based on geographic location, see http://acorn.caci.co.uk for further information), and 
the proportions of individuals in their very local area who work in higher or lower managerial or professional 
occupations, whose highest educational qualification is NQF Level 3 or above, and who own their home, 
merged in on the basis of the pupil’s home postcode at age 16. See Chowdry et al. (2013) for more details.
Figure 1: Socio-economic gap in the percentage of English state school students going to university at 
age 18 (in 2010–11) or age 19 (in 2011–12)
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Notes: Based on administrative data for state school students in England taking GCSEs in 2008 and entering 
university anywhere in the UK at age 18 (in 2010–11) or age 19 (in 2011–12). Socio-economic status is defined 
using an index constructed from the combination of free school meal eligibility and various neighbourhood 
deprivation measures (see footnote 1 for further details). The measures of attainment are added separately 
and not cumulatively.
Source: Crawford et al. (2016b).
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Exercise). The left-hand bars show the unconditional gap, which is around 37 percentage 
points in terms of participation overall. (This is the difference between the percentage of 
state school students from the 20 per cent richest families who go to any university in the 
UK at age 18 or 19, around 56 per cent, and the percentage of state school students from 
the 20 per cent poorest families who do the same, around 19 per cent.)
We know that socio-economic gaps in achievement emerge early in children’s lives and 
widen through primary and secondary school (Goodman and Gregg, 2010; Ermisch and 
Del Bono, 2012). The remaining black bars in the figure show various conditional gaps 
in HE participation, i.e. the differences in the participation rates of those from the richest 
and poorest families that remain after controlling for prior achievement at different ages.
The second and third bars show that we can explain some, but not all, of the socio-
economic gap in HE participation if  we compare students who performed similarly in 
primary school (at age 7 or age 11). But it is GCSE performance that seems particularly 
important for understanding socio-economic differences in university entry. Conditional 
on GCSE test scores, the gap in HE participation between students from the top and 
bottom fifth of households is reduced to zero. This suggests that the difference in the 
likelihood of going to university between those from richer and poorer families can be 
entirely explained by their differential performance at the end of secondary school in 
terms of the grades that they achieved in particular qualifications and subjects.
Despite the importance placed on the acquisition of good grades in ‘facilitating’ sub-
jects by some universities2—and the fact that there are substantial differences in the sub-
jects that young people from different socio-economic backgrounds choose at GCSE 
and A-level (Crawford et al., 2016b; Dilnot, 2016)—the omission of subject choice from 
our models does not reduce their explanatory power a great deal. In other words, when 
considering socio-economic differences in university entry, it seems more important that 
students get good grades in respected qualifications than that they achieve those grades in 
particular subjects (although subject choice does make a small difference at the margin, 
especially when considering entry to high-status institutions) (Crawford et al., 2016b).
Gender, as well as socio-economic, differences are also receiving increasing policy 
attention in the UK. In 2014, around 60,000 more females than males were accepted at 
universities in the UK (UCAS, 2015), and white boys from the lowest socio-economic 
groups have the lowest participation rates of any gender, ethnic, and socio-economic 
grouping, with only around 10 per cent of them recorded as going to university at age 
18 or 19 among English state school students taking their GCSEs in 2008 (Crawford 
and Greaves, 2015).
The black bars in Figure 2 show the raw differences in HE participation rates between 
men and women by socio-economic background. They show that men are 5.8 percent-
age points less likely to go to university than women if  they are one of the 20 per cent 
poorest state school students, while the gap increases to 9.2 percentage points when we 
focus on the 20 per cent richest state school students. The grey bars show what happens 
if  we compare boys and girls with the same GCSE attainment, and in most cases the 
remaining gender gaps change sign. In other words, comparing those who performed 
equally well in exams at the end of secondary school, men are actually slightly more 
likely to go to university than women; and, moreover, this positive conditional gap is 
larger for those from lower socio-economic backgrounds. Thus, while boys from the 
2 These are more ‘academic’ subjects which some universities have announced that they find particularly 
attractive for their applicants, e.g. https://www.russellgroup.ac.uk/media/5272/informedchoices-print.pdf.
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poorest families are the least likely to go to university, they are actually slightly more 
likely to go to university than girls from similar backgrounds with similar grades.
Clearly, therefore, substantial progress in widening participation by gender or socio-
economic status is likely to require a narrowing of school achievement gaps earlier 
in the education system. This has happened, albeit to a limited degree, over the last 
few years, with the socio-economic gap in the percentage of pupils reaching five A*–C 
grades at GCSE (a government benchmark in these exams taken at age 16) falling mar-
ginally (by just over 1 percentage point) between 2007–08 and 2012–13.
But it is important to remember that prior achievement is potentially endogenous. 
Students who do not believe they will go to university and those who feel that it is not 
for ‘people like them’ may put less effort into studying. Thus, even though our research 
suggests that differences in secondary school achievement are at the root of differential 
gender and socio-economic participation rates in higher education, it may still be the 
case that influencing students’ aspirations could impact upon their effort and hence 
achievement, and therefore help to reduce differences in university entry.
This is particularly true when considering the type of institution attended. The grey 
bars in Figure 1 show the socio-economic gap in participation at the group of 41 high-
status institutions defined above. The raw difference is somewhat smaller than that for 
participation overall, but this is because fewer students attend high-status institutions 
(just over 21 per cent of state school students from the richest backgrounds, compared 
to just under 3 per cent of those from the poorest backgrounds). The remaining bars 
show that prior attainment plays an important, although somewhat smaller, role in 
explaining socio-economic differences in the likelihood of attending different types of 
universities than it does in explaining differences in participation overall. The fact that 
Figure 2: Gender gap in the percentage of English state school students going to university at age 18 
(in 2010–11) or age 19 (in 2011–12), by socio-economic background
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Notes: See notes to Figure 1. The conditional gaps (shown in the dark grey bars) account for the qualifications, 
subjects, and grades achieved at the end of secondary school.
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prior attainment does not fully explain the socio-economic difference in participation 
at high-status universities suggests that differences in application or admission to such 
institutions among similarly qualified students from different socio-economic back-
grounds may make a further small contribution to the gaps, and hence may be worthy 
of further investigation (Anders, 2012; Boliver, 2013).
Reducing these gaps in participation has been a focus of policy in recent years, with 
universities now required to report on their efforts to ‘widen’ participation in order 
to charge fees of more than £6,000 per year. While robust quantitative evidence on 
the effectiveness of these interventions is relatively scarce (Sutton Trust, 2015), there is 
some evidence that the socio-economic gap in HE participation among young entrants 
has fallen slightly over the last decade or so, even as tuition fees have risen substantially 
(Crawford, 2012; Crawford et al., 2016b), suggesting that some progress is being made.
III. Socio-economic differences in university outcomes
We have seen that there are large socio-economic differences in the likelihood of going 
to university, including by type of institution attended. But are there socio-economic 
differences in how well students perform once they are at university as well? This sec-
tion suggests that differences are apparent from the time students enter higher educa-
tion to the time they leave.
We collected data from 11 universities in England on around 40,000 students who 
entered higher education between 2006 and 2011. Of these 11 institutions, five are mem-
bers of the Russell Group, and six are not, meaning that our sample over-represents the 
Russell Group (which has 24 members out of 118 universities). The appendix provides 
some additional context for the sample of students included in our data, but in summary 
it is broadly representative of UK undergraduate students in terms of gender, but is 
younger, more white, and likely to be poorer, on average, than the whole student popula-
tion, which should be borne in mind when interpreting the results based on this sample.3
Figure  3 illustrates how end-of-first-year exam performance differs by parental 
income quintile, showing that students from the lowest quintile group score, on aver-
age, 11 per cent of a standard deviation below those from the highest quintile group.4 
These differences fall, but only slightly (to 10 per cent of a standard deviation), after 
including a basic set of student characteristics, including prior attainment at age 18, 
as well university and subject fixed effects. In other words, students studying the same 
subject at the same institution, who have comparable attainment on entry to university, 
are likely to perform worse in exams at the end of their first year if  they are from lower 
socio-economic backgrounds.5
3 The students are likely to be poorer, on average, because our measure of parental income is based on 
data provided to universities via the Student Loans Company and hence is only available for students who 
applied to borrow money from the government to help cover living costs and who underwent the means test 
(which should capture gross incomes of up to around £50,000 per year).
4 Test scores are standardized within course (institution and subject).
5 There are 153 university–subject combinations in our data, of which just over 50 per cent contain at 
least five rich and five poor students. (Prior attainment varies relatively little among students on the same 
course.) Our results are robust to focusing on the subset of university–subject combinations with at least this 
number of students.
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These differences matter because first-year test scores are important predictors of 
subsequent degree performance, even when they do not count towards final degree clas-
sification. For example, . . .tandard deviation increase in first-year exam performance 
increases the probability of achieving a ‘good degree’ (a first or a 2:1 versus any other 
outcome including drop-out) by 19 percentage points (again after including the above 
set of controls).6 Accounting for first-year exam performance also approximately dou-
bles the proportion of the variation in final degree classification that can be explained 
(from 0.17 to 0.34).
These differences in first-year exam performance by socio-economic background are 
also replicated in other important degree outcomes. For example, using administra-
tive data on all English-domiciled students entering higher education at age 18 or 19 
between 2004–05 and 2011–12—over a million students—we find substantial socio-
economic differences in drop-out, degree completion, and final degree classification.
Figure 4 illustrates these differences. We again focus on state school students split into 
quintiles on the basis of our index of socio-economic status (described in the previous 
section) and plot the average difference in outcomes between the top and bottom 20 per 
cent. The left-hand set of bars shows that state school students from the 20 per cent 
highest socio-economic backgrounds are 8.4 percentage points less likely to drop out of 
higher education entirely within 2 years of entering, 13.3 percentage points more likely to 
complete their degrees within 5 years, and 22.9 percentage points more likely to achieve 
a first or 2:1 than those from the 20 per cent lowest socio-economic backgrounds.7 These 
differences are reduced, but remain significantly different from zero, after accounting for 
background characteristics, rich measures of prior attainment from ages 11, 16, and 18, 
and course (institution times subject) fixed effects.
Figure 3: Average first-year exam performance by parental income quintile
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Source: Average module scores for all first-year students from 11 universities in England. Module scores have 
been standardized by institution and subject. See appendix for further details of this sample.
6 Around 60 per cent of students achieve a first (around 18 per cent) or 2:1 (around 50 per cent) degree 
classification.
7 We include all students when considering the likelihood of dropping out of university, but focus on 
those studying full-time for a first degree in a non-medical subject when considering degree completion and 
degree class, with final degree classification only defined for those who complete their degree within 5 years.
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Research has struggled to identify policies or programmes that are effective at reducing 
socio-economic differences in degree retention and performance. Existing literature sug-
gests that drop-out decisions in particular are often explained by a complex interaction 
of factors that can be difficult to measure or predict—including institutional and subject 
match, or mitigating personal circumstances such as individual or family health issues (e.g. 
Jones (2008) and the references cited therein)—which can be challenging to overcome.
In recent years, the government has encouraged universities to use financial aid to 
attract disadvantaged students and to increase retention, largely in the form of bursaries, 
which were introduced in 2006. Universities typically spend around £300m per year on 
these forms of support (OFFA, 2015), though the amount of cash given to students var-
ies substantially by university, with students at high-status universities tending to receive 
the largest bursary amounts (Chowdry et al., 2012; Wyness, 2016). For example, in 2015, 
the poorest students at Imperial College London received £6,000 per year, while students 
with similar parental incomes received just £500 per year at Liverpool John Moores.8
Given the importance of prior academic attainment in university participation deci-
sions, it is perhaps unsurprising that the small amount of research targeted on bursa-
ries reveals no impact of these forms of aid on participation (Corver, 2010). This, in 
conjunction with research by OFFA (2014) into the impact of bursary aid on student 
performance while at university, has led some universities to discontinue these forms of 
8 See https://www.theguardian.com/education/2015/jun/10/which-universities-offer-the-best-bursaries.
Figure 4: Differences between state school students from 20 per cent highest socio-economic back-
grounds and 20 per cent lowest socio-economic backgrounds in likelihood of dropping out, completing 
degree, and achieving a first or 2:1 degree class
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Notes: Based on administrative data on students studying at state secondary schools in England who went to 
university at age 18 or 19 between 2004–05 and 2011–12. The measure of socio-economic background used 
is as defined in the previous section.
Source: Crawford (2014a).
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support. However, more recent research (Murphy and Wyness, 2016) reveals a positive 
effect of bursary aid on students’ degree performance, driven by increases in annual 
completion rates and test scores, suggesting there may be a role for financial aid in rais-
ing retention.
Policies targeted towards ensuring students are sufficiently well prepared for univer-
sity and that they receive appropriate learning and teaching support once there, have 
also been highlighted as particularly important, especially in the first year (e.g. Laing 
and Robinson, 2003; Quinn et al., 2005). Our results highlighting the importance of 
first-year exam results for subsequent degree performance support this, suggesting that 
they could potentially be used as an indicator of student vulnerability, with universities 
targeting further support on students who performed less well at this point.
A different picture emerges if  we compare the degree performance of students who 
attended different secondary schools rather than coming from different socio-economic 
backgrounds. Figure 5 splits state school students into quintiles on the basis of the pro-
portion of students in the school who achieved five A*–C grades at GCSE.9 It shows 
that, while the raw differences (shown in the left-hand bars) are similar in sign and 
magnitude to those by socio-economic background, they change sign after accounting 
for other characteristics (the right-hand set of bars)—specifically after accounting for 
attainment at age 16. This suggests that, comparing students from similar backgrounds, 
on the same courses, and with similar prior attainment, those from worse-performing 
schools actually go on to do better at university, on average, than those from better-
performing schools.
Figure 5: Differences between state school students from 20 per cent highest-performing schools and 
20 per cent lowest-performing schools in likelihood of dropping out, completing degree, and achieving 
a first or 2:1 degree class
-10
-5
0
5
10
15
20
Raw differences Differences aer accoun
ng for student
characteris
cs, rich measures of prior
aainment and course fixed effects
Pe
rc
en
ta
ge
 p
oi
nt
s
Dropout within 2 years Complete degree within 5 years Graduate with a first or 2:1
Notes: See notes to Figure 4.
Source: Crawford (2014b).
9 Crawford (2014b) shows that a similar pattern emerges when comparing schools on the basis of value-
added or school type rather than school performance.
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These results could be interpreted as suggesting that, on average, pupils from poorer-
performing schools with the same grades as those from better-performing schools have 
higher ‘potential’ to do well at university. This may be because they have had to work 
more independently or received less support from their teachers than students from 
higher-performing schools, which may reap dividends when they are faced with the 
more autonomous learning environment at university.
This may, in turn, suggest that university entry requirements could be lowered for 
pupils from poorly performing schools in order to equalize the potential of  all stu-
dents being admitted to university: in other words, universities may want to contex-
tualize offers on the basis of  secondary school attended (and, indeed, some already 
do). The same does not appear to hold, on average, for individuals from different 
socio-economic backgrounds, however. That is not to say that universities should 
not use information on individuals’ own socio-economic background to inform their 
admissions processes; simply that it is more challenging to identify those from lower 
socio-economic backgrounds with strong potential to succeed academically in higher 
education.
The results in this section indicate that, even among the selected group of students 
who make it to university, those from disadvantaged backgrounds perform significantly 
less well in their first-year exams, are more likely to drop out, less likely to complete their 
degree, and less likely to achieve a ‘good’ final degree classification. Given the strong 
returns to higher education, including by degree class, that are evident in the UK, this 
may suggest that socio-economic differences will persist once students have left univer-
sity as well. The next section presents some evidence on these important issues.
IV. Career opportunities for graduates by family 
background
While we saw in previous sections that some progress is being made in reducing inequali-
ties in educational attainment and HE participation, the question of how this translates 
into greater social mobility will also reflect the extent to which increasing educational 
equality results in greater equality in opportunities in adulthood as well. This section 
focuses on how graduates from different social backgrounds fare in their early labour 
market experiences.
Graduate leaver surveys can give us a picture of access to early career opportunities 
by social background. While measuring earnings early in a career is problematic as they 
are often a poor proxy for lifetime earnings, focusing on graduates’ early transitions 
into different types of jobs can be informative.
Macmillan et al. (2015) consider the importance of family background for graduates 
leaving university in 2006–07 in terms of whether they are working in a ‘top’ profes-
sion 3.5 years after graduation. Defining top professions as any NS-SEC 1 occupation, 
Figure 6 replicates some of their findings, showing the differences in access to these top 
jobs between graduates who previously attended state and private schools. The first bar 
shows that privately educated graduates are 9.5 percentage points more likely to secure 
a high-status occupation than state educated graduates, even if  they come from simi-
larly affluent families and neighbourhoods.
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Bars 2 and 3 of Figure  6 indicate that a modest part of this difference is driven 
by demographics and educational attainment (A-level performance, degree subject, 
and degree classification). A larger part of the story is which university the graduate 
attended. This is likely to reflect the fact that privately educated graduates have greater 
access to elite institutions on which employers typically focus their recruitment strate-
gies. Indeed, Ashley et al. (2015) find that one of the main reasons for this over-repre-
sentation of privileged graduates in top professions is the tendency of large professional 
firms to recruit the majority of new entrants from a small group of top universities.
The final column of Figure 6 indicates that staying on to do a higher degree is also 
a (smaller) part of the picture. However, even when accounting for all of these other 
observed differences between graduates, a privately educated graduate is still 2.5 per-
centage points more likely to secure a high-status occupation than a state school gradu-
ate from a similar family and neighbourhood, with the same educational qualifications, 
who went to the same university, and who studied the same subject. Similar differences 
can also be observed within particular types of high-status occupation, including busi-
ness, the law, and life sciences.
Focusing on one specific employer, the government’s flagship graduate development 
programme, Fast Stream, a recent report from the Bridge Group highlights the extent 
of inequality in access (Bridge Group, 2016). They state that:
in relation to socio-economic diversity, the Fast Stream is unrepresentative of the 
population at large. To put this in context, the profile of the intake is less diverse 
by social background than the student population at the University of Oxford.
Focusing on applicants, the report finds that candidates from the most selective univer-
sities are most likely to apply to the Fast Stream and, within universities, students from 
higher socio-economic backgrounds are more likely to apply, contributing to a profile 
Figure 6: Marginal effects of private school attendance on being in a high-status occupation (NS-SEC 
1) 3.5 years after graduation compared to other occupations (NS-SEC 2–7)
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Source: Macmillan et al. (2015).
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of applicants that looks similar to the profile of students at Oxbridge. However, the 
selection process exacerbates differences by socio-economic background further, with 
a higher proportion of high socio-economic status candidates getting through at each 
stage. The implications of this are stark. Even if  the Fast Stream only recruited from 
Oxford, it would still end up with fewer recruits from working class backgrounds than 
the student body of that elite institution. The UK Cabinet Office, which oversees the 
civil service, has announced urgent action to address this imbalance.
These findings provide powerful evidence that degree attainment is not enough 
to equalize socio-economic differences in early career entry into elite occupations. 
Attendance at high-status universities partially explains the higher entry rates of those 
from more privileged backgrounds into these professions, suggesting that recruitment 
by leading firms may be rather narrowly focused on these top institutions. But even 
among those attending the same university, attaining the same degree class in the same 
subject, those from more privileged backgrounds are more likely to access the top pro-
fessions. This may reflect other aspects of the recruitment process—including, perhaps, 
the existence of family networks within these occupations or of differences in softer 
skills, such as greater self-confidence during interviews. But it is clear that degree attain-
ment is not a passport that equalizes access to elite careers.
V. Earnings after attending university
While the early career opportunities of graduates are indicative of likely patterns of 
intergenerational mobility, it is also important to look at later measures of occupation 
and earnings, when individuals are fully established in the labour market, in order to 
get a complete picture of how inequalities persist across generations. While there are 
clear differences in access to the professions by socio-economic background, are these 
gradients exacerbated as individuals progress through their careers?
Britton et al. (2016) examine the variation in graduates’ earnings using administrative 
tax records associated with student loan repayment. Earnings are measured approximately 
10 years after degree completion. Family background is not directly observed, but the data-
base includes the amount the graduate borrowed in their first year of borrowing, which 
depends on family income. Using this information, they can impute a relatively crude 
measure of family income, splitting borrowers into the most affluent fifth and the rest.
They show that male graduates from these higher-income backgrounds earn around 
30 per cent more than male graduates from all other backgrounds when assessed at the 
median of the earnings distribution. The equivalent difference for women at the median 
is 20 per cent, and the gaps were even larger at the 90th percentile of the earnings dis-
tribution. Moreover, even after allowing for institution and degree subject, as well as a 
limited set of student characteristics (but not prior educational attainment), those from 
the richest backgrounds continue to earn around 10 per cent more than those from 
poorer backgrounds at the median.
The great advantage of the data used by Britton et al. (2016) is its large sample size. 
However, it is based on fairly recent graduates and captures their earnings relatively early 
in their careers (up to around age 33), after which many graduates continue to expe-
rience significant earnings growth. Focusing on relatively early measures of earnings 
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may lead us to underestimate the gap between those from different backgrounds—a 
phenomenon known in the social mobility literature as ‘life-cycle bias’ (as shown, for 
example, by Haider and Solon, 2006).
This may be particularly problematic if  pay differs even among individuals who 
go into similar occupations. For example, a recent study by Laurison and Friedman 
(2016), using data from the Labour Force Survey, shows that those from semi-routine 
and routine families earn significantly less than colleagues from higher professional and 
managerial families, even among individuals who go into elite occupations. Similar to 
findings in Macmillan et al. (2015), this pay gap is most pronounced in finance, law, and 
medicine, with no significant difference in earnings by parental NS-SEC among those 
who are scientists or engineers.
The data used by both Britton et al. (2016) and Laurison and Friedman (2016) has 
some limitations, however. Both have access to only relatively crude measures of family 
background, with Britton et al. (2016) relying on a severely right-censored measure of 
income and Laurison and Friedman (2016) relying on recall measures of parental occu-
pation in childhood. Both datasets are also limited in terms of the information they 
hold on pre-university educational attainment. So as a new, confirmatory, contribution 
to this literature, we consider the extent to which graduates’ lifetime earnings and the 
returns to a degree vary by family background, using rich measures of family income 
recorded during childhood and after conditioning on early cognitive and non-cognitive 
skills, pre-university attainment, university attended, and degree subject studied for a 
cohort now at their prime-age in terms of earnings levels.
We begin by summarizing the earnings and employment outcomes of members of 
the British Cohort Study that were born in 1970 (now aged 46) by family background in 
Table 1. Earnings are measured as an average of those reported at age 38 and age 4210 and 
are summarized by the terciles of average family income in childhood (when the survey 
respondent was aged 10 and 16). This table indicates that inequalities persist across genera-
tions for this cohort, with those from more affluent families earning 40 per cent more than 
those from middle-income families and 60 per cent more than those from poorer families.
If  we consider this by graduate status, differences by social background are very 
large for males (top panel, Table  1). Not only are men from more affluent families 
more likely to go to university, but there are large inequalities even within groups of 
similarly educated individuals by social background, with graduates from the richest 
third of families earning almost 50 per cent more than graduates from the poorest 
third and approaching 30 per cent more than graduates from middle-income families. 
Among non-graduates the higher earnings associated with coming from a more afflu-
ent family are far less marked, at just over a third more than those from the poorest 
families. In other words, getting a degree raises earnings for graduates from all family 
backgrounds but it does very little to level the playing field between those from different 
backgrounds. The somewhat higher magnitudes in these gaps compared to those found 
in Britton et al. (2016) probably reflects the later point in the life-cycle and more tightly 
focused low-income group.
Earnings differences are necessarily restricted just to those in work, so we also illus-
trate employment differences by family background for graduates and non-graduates. 
10 Where only one observation is available, that earnings value is used. Missing dummies are included to 
indicate missing earnings at 38 or 42.
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As might be expected, men from poorer families are more likely to be out of work at 
both age 38 and 42, though only around 2 per cent of the overall sample are out of 
work at either age. Among graduates, those from poorer families are twice as likely to 
be out of work as those from the most affluent families, meaning that differences in 
earnings between those from different socio-economic backgrounds are likely to some-
what understate the overall differences as a result of differential employment chances.
The story for women (lower panel, Table 1) is far less acute but in the same direction. 
While women from high-income families are far more likely to get a degree than their 
low-income counterparts, women from affluent families earn a little over a third more 
than those from poorer families. Among graduates, this earnings premium is under 
30 per cent, which is a similar earnings differential as for non-graduates. Interestingly, 
non-employment among graduate women is not focused on those from poorer families; 
rather, at these ages graduate women from well-off  families are less likely to work than 
those from poorer backgrounds.
These basic summary measures show that graduate earnings differ substantially 
by family background and this is more marked for men than women, consistent with 
Britton et al. (2016). Higher education per se therefore appears to go only some of the 
way to offering equal labour market opportunities. We might well think that these strik-
ing earnings differences among graduates from different socio-economic backgrounds 
reflect other differences between these individuals, including educational attainment 
before attending university, the status of university attended, and the course studied, 
etc. Previous sections have illustrated large socio-economic gradients in these factors 
across the life course. We therefore consider the extent to which attending the same 
institution, taking the same degree, and achieving the same degree class accounts for 
these earning differences.
Moving to a regression framework to explore earnings differentials conditional on 
these other factors, Panel A  of Table  2 estimates earnings differentials within male 
Table 1: Monthly earnings and employment status by family background and degree status
Low income Middle income High income
Males
Average earnings 38 and 42 £2,013.18 £2,354.72 £3,253.65
Non-graduates £1,841.26 £2,098.81 £2,568.61
Graduates £2,882.54 £3,416.89 £4,239.83
N (N with degree) 957 (158) 958 (186) 949 (389)
Proportion non-graduates out of work 3.6 2.2 1.7
Proportion graduates out of work 1.6 0.4 0.7
Females
Average earnings 38 and 42 £1,104.67 £1,297.10 £1,599.57
Non-graduates £978.11 £1,097.66 £1,227.26
Graduates £1,864.87 £2,200.75 £2,231.64
N (N with degree) 1,072 (153) 1,073 (194) 1,071 (397)
Proportion non-graduates out of work 9.5 7.5 7.5
Proportion graduates out of work 3.6 6.8 6.0
Note: Sample based on those with earnings at 38 or 42 and being employed (and not self-employed) in that 
period, observing income at 10 or 16, gender, and degree status. Figures for proportion out of work for larger 
sample of individuals where only restricted to observing income at 10/16 and gender and degree status. £ in 
2001 prices.
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graduates by terciles of family background. Column 1, for reference, shows the earn-
ings gaps between terciles of family income for the whole population. Those from the 
richest third of families earn 26 log points (approximately 26 per cent) more than those 
from middle-income families, who in turn earn 16 log points more than those from 
poorer families, with a total earnings gap between those from the richest and poorest 
families of over 40 per cent.
Column 2 shows this among graduates. Here, the earnings gaps are fourth-fifths of 
the raw gaps for all men (31 log points between the top and bottom terciles among 
graduates compared to 42 log points for all men), meaning that earnings gaps by 
family background are almost as large among graduates as for the population as a 
whole. Column 3 shows earnings differentials conditional on early measures of literacy, 
numeracy, and IQ (taken at age 10). These make little difference to the benefit of com-
ing from a rich family among graduates. Column 4 introduces measures of achievement 
(number of GCSEs at grades A–C and number of A-levels). These can explain around 
a quarter of the earnings differentials among graduates. Including controls for insti-
tution attended11 and broad subject studied12 does not explain any of the remaining 
differentials.
Overall, controlling for a range of  measures of  pre-university skills and qualifica-
tions, as well as university attended and degree subject studied, explains only a third 
of  the earnings gap among male graduates by family background (10 points of  a 31 
log point raw gap). These large earnings gaps thus cannot be considered meritocratic 
in the sense that they purely reflect differences in educational attainment.13
Within this data the number of male graduates from poorer families is quite small 
(158) which might raise concerns about common support compared to the larger samples 
from affluent families, especially when conditioning on educational attainment. We note, 
though, the similar results obtained by Laurison and Friedman (2016) using the larger 
Table 2: Male earnings differentials by family background and graduate status
All Graduates Graduates Graduates Graduates
Low parental income –0.156 –0.125 –0.121 –0.073 –0.088
(0.03)*** (0.07)* (0.07)* (0.07) (0.07)
Middle income Baseline Baseline Baseline Baseline Baseline
High parental income 0.263 0.185 0.160 0.136 0.124
(0.03)*** (0.06)*** (0.06)*** (0.06)** (0.06)**
Early skills measures x x x
Education x x
Institution FE x
Subject studied x
N 2,864 733 733 733 733
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. *90% confidence, **95% confidence, ***99% confidence. Sample based 
on those with earnings at age 38 or 42 and being employed (and not self-employed) in that period, observing 
income at 10 or 16, gender, and degree status. Dummy included if earnings is missing in either period.
11 Four groupings covering the Golden Triangle, older and newer pre-1992 institutions, and 1992 univer-
sities. Expanding this to a full set of university dummies makes little difference to the results.
12 Seven categories. Again a wider set of categories gives very similar results.
13 Panel A of Table A2 replicates this analysis for non-graduates and, again, around a third of these 
earnings gaps are explained by test scores and qualifications achieved (9 out of 31 log points).
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Labour Force Survey looking among those in top occupations, and Britton et al. (2016) 
using much larger samples of graduates who are at an earlier stage in their careers.14
Given the findings from the previous section, showing that there is differential access 
to top jobs by family background, together with the findings of Laurison and Friedman 
(2016), which show that earnings differ sharply by family background even among 
those that make it into elite occupations, we might hypothesize that family background 
matters more at the top of the earnings distribution.
To check this, we repeat this analysis at the upper end of the graduate earnings dis-
tribution. We use unconditional quantile regression analysis to explore the earnings 
premium associated with coming from a more affluent family at the 75th percentile of 
the graduate earnings distribution rather than at the mean (as in Table 2). These results 
are shown in Table 3. The raw earnings gaps by family background are larger at this 
point in the distribution, with a 44 log point gap (compared to 31 points at the mean) 
between those graduates from the highest and lowest terciles. This indicates that the 
returns to coming from a richer family are strongest in the upper portions of the earn-
ings distribution, consistent with Gregg et al. (2015).
Conditioning on test scores through to university attended makes more of a differ-
ence in this setting, too, reducing the 44 log point gap between graduates from the most 
and least affluent families to 28 log points (see the final column of Table 3). However, 
the remaining earnings gap is still almost as large as the unconditional gap in Table 2, 
suggesting that family background matters more among high earners than on average, 
even conditional on a wide range of educational markers.15
The story for women is more egalitarian (Table  4). Overall the earnings boost 
associated with coming from a more affluent family is lower: among graduates it is 
21 log points, compared to 31 log points for men, and similar to the 19 log points 
Table 3: Graduate male earnings differentials by family background—unconditional quantile regression 
analysis assessed at 75th percentile
All Graduates Graduates Graduates Graduates
Low parental income –0.116 –0.168 –0.130 –0.065 –0.099
(0.03)*** (0.09)* (0.09) (0.09) (0.09)
Middle income Baseline Baseline Baseline Baseline Baseline
High parental income 0.300 0.275 0.243 0.213 0.176
(0.03)*** (0.09)*** (0.09)*** (0.09)** (0.09)**
Early skills measures x x x
Education x x
Institution FE x
Subject studied x
N 2,864 733 733 733 733
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. *90% confidence, **95% confidence, ***99% confidence. Sample based 
on those with earnings at age 38 or 42 and being employed (and not self-employed) in that period, observing 
income at 10 or 16, gender, and degree status. Dummy included if earnings is missing in either period.
14 We also undertook some additional analysis ourselves using the Labour Force Survey (LFS), with 
similar findings. Results available from the authors on request.
15 We repeat this analysis for women in Appendix Table A3.
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for non-graduate women (see Panel B of Appendix Table A2).16 Conditioning on test 
scores makes no difference to these earnings gaps among female graduates.
It is worth noting that the earnings premium associated with coming from a richer 
family relative to a middle-income family is much stronger for men than for women, 
while the difference between middle- and low-income families is much stronger for 
women than for men. This suggests that family background matters differently for male 
and female graduates.
These results show that for a cohort now in their mid-40s, earnings of graduates differ 
substantially by family background. This is most marked among men, especially for those 
who go on to be high earners. This strongly suggests that a degree, and even a degree from 
the same type of institution and in the same subject, does not equalize opportunities to 
access high-paying jobs for those from less affluent families. Taken together with the results 
from the previous section, it suggests there are clear problems in recruitment into and pro-
gression within elite jobs even among those with the same educational achievement, sug-
gesting that equalizing educational achievement does not necessarily translate into equal 
career opportunities.
Steps are being taken to open up access to top professions. Last year’s ‘State of 
the Nation’ report by the Social Mobility Commission highlights the Social Mobility 
Business Compact, a voluntary commitment by employers to improve access to those 
from lower socio-economic backgrounds and the ‘Champion Tier’ of firms within this 
who are committed to collecting and publishing data about the intake of their employ-
ees in relation to key characteristics. There is also a movement within professional firms 
to limit their use of academic criteria such as A-levels when recruiting for graduate jobs, 
and to increase their use of contextualized and blind applications in order to prevent 
selection based on institutions (Social Mobility Commission, 2015). But a lot more can 
Table 4: Female earnings differentials by family background and graduate status
All Graduates Graduates Graduates Graduates
Low parental income –0.134 –0.180 –0.176 –0.180 –0.187
(0.03)*** (0.08)** (0.08)** (0.08)** (0.08)**
Middle income Baseline Baseline Baseline Baseline Baseline
High parental income 0.205 0.027 0.032 0.005 –0.024
(0.03)*** (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07)
Early skills measures x x x
Education x x
Institution FE x
Subject studied x
N 3,216 744 744 744 744
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. *90% confidence, **95% confidence, ***99% confidence. Sample based 
on those with earnings at age 38 or 42 and being employed (and not self-employed) in that period, observing 
income at 10 or 16, gender, and degree status. Dummy included if earnings is missing in either period.
16 We also checked our results for women using LFS data as discussed in footnote 14 for men. This 
confirms that earnings gaps by family background among graduates are approximately 10 log points smaller 
for women than for men.
Higher education, career opportunities, and intergenerational inequality 569
be done with regards to access, and firms must be equally vigilant about ensuring that 
career progression is not skewed by socio-economic background.
VI. Conclusion
In this paper we have sought to draw together established and new facts about the links 
between socio-economic background and university access and outcomes, taking a life-
course approach. We find substantial socio-economic differences at each stage. Young 
people from poorer backgrounds are, on average, less likely to go to university than 
their richer peers. Even among the selected group who do go to university, they are less 
likely to attend the highest status institutions, less likely to graduate, and less likely to 
achieve the highest degree classes.
These differences in degree outcomes contribute to the reduced likelihood of  mov-
ing into a professional job and the lower average earnings of  graduates from poorer 
families, but the differences in labour market outcomes that we observe go well beyond 
these differences in degree achievement. Indeed, in new analysis presented in this 
paper, we find that the average graduate wage for a child from a poor family is compa-
rable to the average wage of  all graduates and non-graduates combined from affluent 
families, and that these differences persist even once we account for educational attain-
ment, including university attended and subject studied. This highlights that getting 
a good degree from an elite university is not enough to equalize career opportunities 
to the professions and prime age earnings for those from different socio-economic 
backgrounds.
Attendance at any university at age 18 or 19 is similar among those from richer 
and poorer families with equivalent GCSE and A-level attainment. But even after 
these factors are taken into account, those from less affluent families remain under-
represented at high-status institutions. This suggests that these elite universities could 
still do more to attract those from deprived backgrounds. One of  the ways in which 
they might—and, indeed, some already do—try and do this is to intervene during 
secondary school. There is clear evidence that poorer children who are high achieving 
at age 11 are less likely to go on to be high achieving at the end of  secondary school 
compared to their richer peers (Crawford et al., 2016a). This may in part reflect a 
sense that university is not for ‘people like them’, reducing their motivation and hence 
the effort they put into their studies. Universities can help to support young people 
from poorer backgrounds during this critical period, raising aspirations and hope-
fully also attainment.
Some universities already use such interventions as one of the ways through which 
they try to ‘widen’ access to their institutions. But these programmes are often targeted 
on a relatively narrow range of pupils or schools, often located close to the university 
running the intervention, and are frequently run in isolation from similar programmes 
by neighbouring institutions. Greater coordination of such initiatives, perhaps even a 
national strategy, would potentially be a better solution. There is also a dearth of robust 
quantitative evidence of the effectiveness of such interventions, and the evidence base 
in this area needs to be improved as a matter of urgency. Nevertheless, there is evidence 
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of some, albeit relatively slow, progress in reducing socio-economic gaps in access to 
university in recent years.
Yet our research also highlights that the need for policy intervention goes well beyond 
the first day of university. Greater support for students from poorer backgrounds while 
they are at university, to ensure that they are able to stay and complete their degrees 
is also important—and, again, the evidence base on what works to increase retention 
needs to be improved.
Even beyond university, however, obtaining a degree—even a higher-class degree 
from a top institution—is not a passport to equality of access to top professions and 
higher earnings. Here, employers have a responsibility to consider their access and pro-
gression rates by socio-economic background. While some firms have begun to collect 
data on this, there is much room for improvement. Firms should be more transparent 
about their existing staff  mix and actively encourage those from more deprived back-
grounds with relevant qualifications to apply and progress.
Overall, the analysis presented in this paper highlights the need for policy action 
throughout the student life-course to ensure equality of opportunity and outcomes 
for those from different socio-economic backgrounds, even among those who make 
it to university. It is the duty of all stakeholders—including schools, universities, and 
employers—to keep the doors to opportunity open as wide as possible to those from 
deprived backgrounds. The evidence presented here suggests this is currently far from 
the case.
Appendix
The analysis of attainment trajectories at university makes use of a unique administra-
tive dataset collected from 11 UK universities. The data comprise the entire undergrad-
uate population of UK and EU students for up to six cohorts of students beginning 
their studies between 2006 and 2011. These data were collected as part of a bigger 
project focused on understanding the impact of higher education bursaries on student 
performance.
In order to obtain this data we contacted all 118 higher education institutions 
in the UK, asking them for individual-level student data on attainment, parental 
income, and bursaries awarded. Of  these, 50 agreed to share their data, and we 
finally received data from 25, all based in England, giving us a sample of  341,398 stu-
dents. As our estimation strategy requires parental income and module score data, 
we discarded universities who did not provide data on parental income or those at 
universities that only provided banded parental income, as well as universities that 
did not provide data on student module scores. We also discarded students studying 
above or below degree level, and students of  non-traditional entry age (those aged 
20 or over). This reduced our sample substantially, leaving us with 11 universities 
and 40,183 students.
The dataset tracks students throughout the course of their degree. Therefore we have 
information on each student’s final degree outcome, including whether they dropped 
out, their year of drop-out, and their average annual course scores. Since these scores 
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are not comparable across universities or individuals, we standardized test scores by 
university subject and year.
The selected nature of the sample means that it is not representative of the university 
sector. Among the 11 universities represented, five are Russell Group, and six are non-
Russell Group. Therefore our sample is over-representative in terms of Russell Group 
universities.
In Table A1 we present some descriptive statistics on the individuals in our sample. 
Average annual parental income in our sample is £28,492—though we only observe 
the parental income data of students who provide their data to the Student Loans 
Company for means-testing of student maintenance loans and grants. Since the upper 
limit for means-testing is £50,000 per annum we generally observe the parental income 
of those at or below this limit. Therefore, our sample is likely to be more disadvantaged 
than the student population as a whole.
As Table A1 also shows, 46 per cent of the sample are male, the average age is just 
over 18 and 81 per cent of the sample are white. According to the most recent Higher 
Education Statistics Agency (HESA) statistics (HESA, 2015: Table  6a), 45 per cent 
of full-time undergraduates are male, 61 per cent are under 22, and 60 per cent are 
white. Therefore, our sample is representative in terms of gender, but is younger and 
more white than the UK undergraduate population, which is expected given our sample 
restrictions. The average UCAS entry tariff  for our students is 287, which is roughly 
equivalent to BBC in terms of A-level scores.
Thus, when interpreting the results based on this data, readers should be mind-
ful that the sample is potentially more disadvantaged than the UK undergraduate 
student population. In particular, income data is right censored, so there are fewer 
students from the most highly advantaged households than there would be with a 
fully representative sample. This could lead us to underestimate the socio-economic 
gradient in first-year test scores. Our sample of  students are also more likely to be 
attending a Russell Group institution. This could mean that students are less likely 
to have low educational attainment, again potentially leading us to underestimate the 
socio-economic gradient.
Table A1: Summary statistics (universities sampled in section III)
Mean Std dev.
Household income £ 28,492 £ 36,325
UCAS entry points 287.14 81.44
Gender
 Male 0.46 0.5
 Female 0.54 0.5
Ethnicity
 White 0.81 0.4
 Non-white 0.19 0.39
Age on entry 18.34 0.47
N 40,183
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